Man pleads guilty to stealing rare Chinese manuscripts from UCLA with fake names

It was a theft designed to go unnoticed: check out a centuries-old manuscript, then quietly return a fake in its place. A California man has now admitted to running that scheme against UCLA.

The scheme

Jeffrey Ying, 39, of Fremont, pleaded guilty to a federal charge of theft of major artwork in connection with the disappearance of rare Chinese manuscripts from UCLA's East Asian Library, CBS Los Angeles reported. Prosecutors say that over a period stretching from late 2024 into 2025, he used multiple aliases to gain access to the library's collections and check out valuable works, some of them centuries old.

Rather than simply keep the originals, prosecutors say, Ying returned counterfeit copies in their place, using blank manuscripts and library asset tags to make the fakes pass for the real thing, CBS Los Angeles reported. Investigators later found such materials, along with fraudulent identification and library cards in his various names, according to the reporting.

What was taken

The stolen works were valued at about $216,000 in total, with one volume alone, believed to date to the 17th century, worth well over $10,000, as MyNewsLA reported. The items were the kind of rare, historically significant materials that libraries keep under restricted access precisely because they are difficult to replace.

How it unraveled

The case came together after UCLA staff noticed manuscripts missing and began pulling on the thread, and one of the aliases was linked to similar activity at another university library, MyNewsLA reported. The FBI's Art Crime Team took part in the investigation alongside campus police, Fox News reported.

The outcome

Having pleaded guilty, Ying faced sentencing in the case; the charge of theft of major artwork can carry a substantial prison term, though the actual sentence reflected the specifics of the case and any recovery of the works, CBS Los Angeles reported. Beyond the legal outcome, the episode is a reminder of a quiet vulnerability at research libraries, whose treasures are meant to be studied, and are therefore, by design, within reach.